Falklands 30. Another Book on the Falklands War 1982.
Some of the books dealing with the Falklands War of 1982, which were produced “in a rush” to catch the market can now be seen for the inaccuracies and errors they contained.
As time has passed and with the detailed analysis of the War then so should the books after nearly 30 years be somewhat more accurate than some produced at the time.
Regrettably this seems not to be the case with a recent example and whilst everyone is entitled to their views, when an author (with a book to sell) in a recent letter to a national newspaper seems to have gathered some odd distorted ideas of the early events after the invasion which bear little validity or even have similarity to the facts then it is worth while considering whether an investment in such a book is worthwhile. This review suggests it is not.
A recent letter sent to a national newspaper, containing some details of the book in question, is reproduced here together with correspondence in reply from those who, in Stanley at the time, were few in number, were charged with repulsing any foreign attempt to take the Islands and who bravely placed their lives “on the line”. Their knowledge of what actually went on is certainly different and from all records and analysis over nearly 30 years, rather more accurate.
The book in question is – The Dishonourable War: Falkland Islands 1982 by Edmund Paul Carlisle and on the basis of the following letter is not recommended as being of any worth to any reference section dealing with the history of the War.
A letter from Edmund P Carlisle to the Daily Mail.
As A British farmer at San Carlos in the Falklands in 1982, I can say Dominic Sandbrook’s foretelling of the re-taking of the Falkland Islands this year (earlier article in the Daily Mail) may prove prophetic. We took the Malvinas from the Argentinians in 1830 and have refused arbitration ever since. The UN supported their claim and after years of negotiation the Foreign Office had agreed to transfer sovereignty in 1981. But a campaign by the Falkland Islands Company led to ‘subject to a referendum by the islanders’ being added to the agreement – and, by a small majority, they blocked the transfer. Our ambassador and military attache were warned to prepare for an invasion. Plans were read by GCHQ and the U.S. but no threat of retaliation was issued by our government.
I was in Buenos Aires at the time, negotiating a deal on sheep sales, and was told an invasion was imminent. Next day, I flew back to the Islands to find invasion expected, though no attempt had been made to block the airfield.
At about 4am, an Argentine commando of about 30 men landed at Mullet Creek and went overland to Government House, where half the Royal Marine Company was stationed. Their leader was killed but I don’t think they fired a shot before Governor Rex Hunt surrendered, despite the fact that overnight he had been on the radio threatening to fight the ‘Argies’, as he pejoratively called them. Later, the Royal Marines were flown to Uruguay. The civil service continued to act under the Argentinian chief of staff and the Falklands Island Company happily traded with the enemy.
I flew back to Britain to report (SIC) to the Government – in which my brother Mark was education minister – that the islanders had accepted the situation and were fearful of an attempted military recovery. The day after the invasion, Mrs Thatcher told Parliament she’d been taken by surprise when, in fact, there was a naval force moored off Gibraltar, ready to sail, and a nuclear submarine had already been despatched. When the Task Force reached South Georgia, the Argentinian Junta realised their mistake and, on the intervention of Peru, agreed to withdraw.
Our Foreign Secretary Francis Pym was in Washington to agree the final details with the UN Secretary General but that night the captain of the submarine Conqueror spotted the aged Argentinian training cruiser Belgrano, outside the published exclusion zone. Disgracefully, Mrs Thatcher ordered him to sink it – a crime to precipitate a war for the benefit of her political fortunes. It was very nearly a disaster; with seven of our warships sunk and eight heavily damaged by the brave Argentinian air force. More than 250 British servicemen died and 649 Argentinians, with many more wounded, in this unnecessary and dishonourable war.
On the 25th anniversary of the conflict, Sir Lawrence Freedman at last published The Official History Of The Falklands Campaign. To correct its many errors, I wrote a book which was well received at the Hay-on-Wye book festival but, being controversial, could not get it reviewed or sold by a publisher.
EDMUND PAUL CARLISLE, Cusop Dingle, Herefordshire.
Replies to the national newspaper in response were:
Falklands fightback.
Edmund Carlisle seems to have pro-Argentinian leanings and is, as he was in the Falklands, a mischief-maker (Letters).
He says he flew back to the islands to find an invasion was expected – but his flight from Buenos Aires arrived at Port Stanley on March 31 and neither the Governor Rex Hunt nor anyone else was informed of the pending invasion until the afternoon of April 1. That’s why the airfield wasn’t blocked.
I was a Royal Marine, serving in Naval Party 8901. Along with the rest of the men, we were given our orders at about 20:00 on April 1 and had time only to get together what weapons we had, ammo-up and go out to lay in ambush and wait. It was a very long night. How dare Carlisle say the governor surrendered ‘before a shot was fired’? The first Argentinian forces made for Moody Brook barracks and tried to destroy it. They would have killed us had we been there. We fought the Argentines for more than three hours before we were overwhelmed.
We captured three, destroyed an armoured personnel carrier carrying 27 troops, hit a landing craft and inflicted several casualties. When we were ordered to lay down our weapons, 6,000 Argentinian troops were by then ashore – we were outnumbered by nearly 100 to one.
Why do people who weren’t in Port Stanley at the time peddle lies and untruths? I and the rest of the Marines who were there fought with everything we had. We all expected to die that night: we’re fed up with being slandered.
NICK WILLIAMS, Bournemouth, Dorset.
Maligning the Marines.
There are many better qualified than me to reply to Edmund Carlisle’s views on the Falklands conflict, but few are more qualified than me to refute his version of the events of April 2,1982.
I was in command of the small detachment (not a company) of Royal Marines who deployed to defend Government House and to prevent any invasion being seen as a peaceful annexation.
In an article in April 1982, Mr Carlisle said my report of these events was inflated, inaccurate and
misleading. He also then claimed that the Argentinians had been firing blank ammunition. Now, 30 years on he says they weren’t firing at all.
On behalf of those 60 Royal Marines and sailors who fought so bravely with no hope of reinforcement, let me say categorically: you are as wrong now, Edmund, as you were in 1982.
MIKE NORMAN, Major RM, rtd
address supplied
Falklands inaccuracies.
I lived on the Falklands for eight years and was a resident of Goose Green during the 1982 conflict. I find Edmund Carlisle’s account (Letters) riddled with inaccuracies.
As an employee of the Falkland Island Company, I can assure everyone we did not ‘trade happily’ with the Argentinians: any trading was done at gunpoint, with the threat of force.
No shots fired during the invasion? Read any of the numerous first-hand accounts of the time.
The Argentine ‘training’ cruiser Belgrano was probably the most heavily armed warship in the South Atlantic.
Mr Carlisle says he can’t get his Falklands conflict book published. If its contents are in a similar vein to his letter, he should try his luck with a fantasy fiction publisher.
DUNCAN BAIN, Kettering, Northants.
Edmund Carlisle (Letters) calls the Falklands the ‘Malvinas’ and obviously has an axe to grind. In matters of sovereignty it’s the wishes of the people that count, and the overwhelming majority of people living there don’t wish to be ruled by Argentina. They wish to remain as they are and as they have been for 180 years. That can easily be verified.
The Falklands were invaded at the behest of a fascist Argentine military junta. On being driven out, they were forced to resign and five of their members were convicted of murder in Argentina.
Should we have given way to such people?
The sinking of the Belgrano was a regrettable by-product of this war. Mrs Thatcher didn’t start the war, she reacted to it. The Falklands War was necessary. It was for democracy.
B. W. HALE, Upton, Wirral.
Further comment.
Whilst there are several good and accurate accounts containing the full details of the Invasion and the War this excerpt from the RAF website sets out the early events.
(from http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/inv1.html).
The 80 Royal Marines from Naval Party 8901 under Major Mike Norman RM vacated their barracks at Moody Brook at 0200 hrs and took up their positions to try and defend the islands for as long as possible. Major Norman reasoned that the enemy would go for Port Stanley and neutralize the defences there so that forces could be landed on the airstrip and at the harbour, so he positioned his forces accordingly.
The first priority was to make sure the runway could not be used, so vehicles were parked on it. A small section of men were positioned to cover the obstacles from the south. An observation point was set up east of Yorke point and a machine gun crew was positioned overlooking part of Yorke Bay, a probable landing site, which was obstructed with barbed wire. The machine gunners were given two motorcycles for a quick getaway, and a canoe was also hidden as part of an emergency escape plan.
No.1 Section were placed to the south of No.5 Section with two machine guns, where the road from the airfield to Port Stanley makes a right-angled turn at Hooker’s Point. At the old airstrip to the west of them No.2 Section were placed with a machine gun and an 84mm Carl Gustav anti-tank weapon. They were also equipped with 66mm anti-tank missiles.
No.3 Section were positioned nearby at the VOR air navigation beacon. The job of these sections was to delay the enemy for as long as possible before withdrawing.
No.4 Section were placed on the other side of Stanley harbour with the other 84mm Carl Gustav MAW to engage any enemy landing craft or shipping which tried to get through the narrow entrance to the harbour. They also had a Gemini inflatable boat for transport if they were needed back at Government House.
No.6 Section was placed on the Murray Heights behind Government House to provide warning of any Argentines approaching from the south. An Observation Post was also set up on Sapper Hill and the sole Marine there, Mike Berry, was equipped with a motorcycle for a quick getaway. The headquarters was at Government House, with Major Noott acting as the Governor’s adviser. Major Norman was to be at Look Out Rocks, on the edge of the town to the south-east, commanding the troops on the ground. Finally the motor vessel MV Forrest was sent to sea to keep radar watch over the waters off Port William to the north.
At 0230 hrs Forrest first detected the enemy. At 0330 hrs it was clear a large fleet was manoeuvring off Cape Pembroke.
At 0430 hrs the OP on Sapper Hill detected helicopters near Mullet Creek. 120 of the Argentine Special Forces, the Buzo Tactico, had landed to the south-west of Stanley, near Port Harriet. The Buzo Tactico moved up behind Sapper Hill and divided into two parties. One moved towards the hills behind Stanley overlooking Government House, and the other towards Moody Brook Barracks to the west of Stanely.
Around 0610 hrs the first firing was heard as the Buzo Tactico attacked the barracks at Moody Brook. The attack was ferocious, combining submachine guns with fragmentation and phosphorous grenades, hoping to catch the Marines in bed, showing that later claims of attempts to spare British lives were completely false. If the barracks had not been already deserted, many men would likely have died. With the buildings at Moody Brook ablaze, the Argentine troops moved on toward Stanley.
Realising he had been wrong footed, with all his troops positioned for an attack from the north-east, Major Norman called Numbers 1 and 5 Sections back to Government House, and made for the headquarters himself. At 0615 hrs the second party of the Buzo Tactico in the hills overlooking Stanley started their attack on Government House.
At this point, Numbers 1 and 5 Sections had not yet had time to return from their deployed positions, so Major Norman only had 31 Royal Marines, 11 sailors from HMS Endurance and Jim Fairfield, an ex-marine, to defend the seat of Government.
During this attack six Argentinians attempted to enter the rear of Government House. Three of the six were seen, shot and wounded by the Marines, and the other 3 took refuge in the loft of the maids quarters in an outbuilding behind the main house. These three were later captured by Major Noott. The rest of this attack was met with strong rifle and machine-gun fire from the Marines, and was beaten off
Fifteen minutes later, at 0630 hrs, the main Argentinian force landed at Yorke Bay. This strong force included 18 LVTP-7 ‘Amtrack’ armoured personnel carriers which started to advance towards Stanley immediately. The American-made armoured vehicles were equipped with .30 calibre machine guns, and their advance was reported by the OP at Yorke Point. The Sections of Marines still in the area fought short but intense delaying actions against the advance and then fell back to Stanley as ordered.
Lieutenant Bill Trollope commanded No.2 Section, who did stop one of the LVTP-7’s. The armourer, Marine Gibbs, fired a 66mm LAW (light anti-armour weapon), which struck the passenger compartment of the APC. Marines Brown and Best then hit the front of the vehicle with a shot from their 84mm MAW which stopped the Amtrack, and no-one was seen to exit the vehicle. The remaining vehicles deployed their troops and advanced, giving covering fire with their turret mounted machine-guns, forcing the Marines to retreat or be over-run.
Small but intense actions such as these were now widespread, as the Marines slowly fell back in an attempt to make Government House as ordered. Only 6 men from the outlying Sections managed to return the headquarters, the rest were scattered around Stanley taking part in small fire fights with the enemy. The headquarters was under continuous attack from Buzo Tactico, who repeatedly tried to storm the building.
No.4 Section, on the north side of the harbour near the entrance, detected a landing craft trying to pass through the narrows into the harbour, and fired their 84mm Carl Gustav at the ship. The round holed the side of the vessel, which shortly sank. The Section radioed Government House as the fighting was reaching its peak, reporting several targets, including an Aircraft Carrier and Cruiser. As the Section was asking for target priorities from Major Norman, all contact with them was lost. Now acting on their own, No.4 Section escaped in the Gemini inflatable and remained undetected for four days after the surrender.
Now most of the opposing forces were well dug-in, and the battle entered its final phase, marked by a great deal of sniping between riflemen. As dawn broke, many of the Marines were of the opinion that they could hold out against the estimated 600 men surrounding the headquarters. The Governor, Rex Hunt, learned by telephone that the armoured force was advancing and would soon be at Government House. Against armour, the Marines would have little chance. Major Norman knew that there was also no longer any chance of a breakout, so he suggested that Hunt negotiate with the Argentines. The Governor agreed reluctantly, but did not intend surrender. The go-between for the talks was Vice-Commodore Hector Gilobert, an Argentine who ran LADE, the civil airline supplying the Falklands.
Governor Hunt met with Admiral Busser at Government House and, remarkably, invited him to leave as an unwelcome visitor. The Admiral declined, politely it must be said, and informed the British he had 2800 men ashore and 2000 more still onboard the ships. There really was no longer any option. At 09:25 Hunt ordered the Marines to lay down their arms. The Marines had held out for over 3 hours against a force of far superior numbers and equipment with no loss of British life. It is estimated that 20 – 30 Argentinians died, 5 from around Government house, the crew from the Amtrack and the people aboard the landing craft. This, however, was not the end of the invasion, as another force was heading for South Georgia.
For further information about the author and details of Edmund Carlisle and his current legal action against the Police these can be found (Google) on the www.
The picture is of Edmund Carlisle.